Courts Must Consider the AFCC-O Parenting Guide — Or Explain Why They Didn’t
- Isaac Paonessa
- Apr 26
- 8 min read
Case: Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Div Crt)
Court: Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court
Presiding Judges: Backhouse, Lococo and Shore JJ.
Released: November 13, 2025
When Equal Parenting Time Comes Too Soon - Check AFCC-O Guide
Few decisions in family law feel as consequential as a sudden change to a young child’s living arrangements. For parents of infants and toddlers, stability matters. Routine matters. Familiar caregivers matter. And when a court is asked to change a parenting schedule for a very young child, the expectation is that the decision will be grounded in both the law and accepted child development research.
That is why Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Div Crt), is an important decision for parents and family lawyers. The Divisional Court set aside an interim order that moved a 15-month-old child to equal week-about parenting time. In doing so, the Court emphasized that while the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide is not binding legislation, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind it. If a judge departs from that research, the judge must explain why. See paras. 39-42.
The message is straightforward: parenting decisions for very young children cannot be driven by parental preference, work schedules, or a generalized desire for equal time. They must be made from the child’s perspective.
The Background: A 15-Month-Old Child and a Rapid Change
The case involved a young boy referred to as A., who was 15 months old when the motion was heard. His parents had separated before he was born. Since birth, A. had lived primarily with his mother. The father’s parenting time had gradually increased over time, beginning in the mother’s home, then moving to public spaces, then to unsupervised time in the father’s home. By the time of the motion, however, the father’s parenting time remained limited to alternate weekends for four hours on Saturday and four hours on Sunday. See paras. 4 and 7.
The father sought an immediate transition to equal parenting time on a week-about schedule. His proposed arrangement would allow A. to spend time with his half-siblings during the father’s non-working weeks. The mother did not oppose the father’s increasing involvement, but she argued that A.’s young age, his night breastfeeding, and his history of primary care with her meant that parenting time should increase gradually. She proposed a step-up schedule, with equal time to be considered later, once A. was older and better able to manage longer separations from his primary caregiver. See paras. 8-10.
The motion judge ordered equal parenting time on a week-about basis, with a mid-week overnight visit with the non-residential parent, to be implemented within six weeks. The mother appealed. See paras. 10-12.
The Divisional Court’s Decision
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the motion judge’s order. The matter was sent back to the Superior Court of Justice to be heard before a different judge. Pending the new hearing, the Court imposed a more gradual interim schedule that increased the father’s time in stages, rather than immediately moving A. into equal week-about parenting. The Divisional Court hears appeals of motion decisions for orders that have a temporary effect. See paras. 43-48.
The Court found several legal errors in the motion judge’s reasons. The motion decision failed to properly analyze the statutory best-interest factors under section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. There was no meaningful discussion of baby's age, his developmental stage, his need for stability, the history of care, or the parents’ ability to communicate and cooperate.
The Court held that the test was not whether there was “no reason in law” why the father should not have more time. The proper question was what parenting arrangement was in the best interests of this particular child. See paras. 17-27.
The Court also found that the motion decision failed to properly consider the status quo. A. had lived primarily with his mother for his entire life. The existing arrangement was not artificial or tactical. It was the child’s lived reality. A temporary order that dramatically changed that arrangement required careful explanation, especially given the child’s age and need for stability. See paras. 28-33.
What the Motion Judge Missed
This is where the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide becomes central. Page 16 of the Guide deals specifically with babies aged 9 to 18 months, the exact age range that applied to A. The Guide explains that babies in this stage are undergoing rapid developmental changes and need consistent, predictable routines for waking, eating and sleeping. It states that a baby’s normal routines should be a primary consideration when parents are making a parenting plan. It also cautions that some babies have difficulty with multiple transitions and may do better with one primary caregiver and frequent contact with the other parent.
The Guide does not say that overnights are never appropriate for a baby in this age range. But it says they depend on important conditions: the non-residential parent’s prior involvement in caregiving routines, the parent’s ability to be attuned and responsive to the baby’s needs, the baby’s temperament, and whether the parent can maintain the care schedule of the residential parent and soothe the baby. If one parent has had less parenting and childcare time before separation, the Guide recommends frequent contact every few days, with gradual increases in the length of separation from the primary parent, and the possibility of starting overnights as the child tolerates them.
That is precisely where the motion judge’s analysis fell short. The order moved a 15-month-old child from short alternate-weekend visits to equal week-about parenting within six weeks, without explaining how that schedule fit the child’s developmental needs, breastfeeding routine, sleep routine, temperament, history of care, or ability to tolerate long separations. The judge emphasized the father’s work schedule and sibling time, but did not explain why a departure from the Guide’s age-appropriate, gradual approach was in A.’s best interests.
As the Divisional Court held at paragraph 42, the motion judge ordered equal time for a 15-month-old child as a departure from the AFCC-O Guidelines and social science, without reasons explaining why that departure was best for this child.
The AFCC-O Guide Cannot Be Ignored
The key passage of the case appears at paragraph 40. The Divisional Court stated:
“While the AFCC-O Guidelines are not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind the Guidelines when making parenting orders in the best interests of young children… If a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research, reasons are needed to depart from same.”— Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273, at para. 40.
This is likely the key principle of the case. The Court did not transform the AFCC-O Guide into legislation. But it made clear that the Guide reflects accepted child development research that Ontario courts have relied on when making parenting orders for young children. A judge may depart from the Guide, but not silently. The departure must be justified.
That matters because parenting cases are fact-specific. A parenting schedule suitable for a five-year-old may be unsuitable for a 15-month-old. A schedule that works for a child who has always had two equally involved caregivers may not work for a child who has lived primarily with one parent since birth. The Guide helps courts and parents focus on those differences.
Family Violence Allegations Also Had to Be Addressed
The Divisional Court also found that the motion judge failed to properly analyze allegations of family violence and high conflict. The mother’s materials included allegations of stalking, controlling behaviour, electronic intrusion, harassment, confinement in a car, inappropriate sexual advances, refusal to use the court-ordered communication platform, control over decision-making, and refusal to pay reasonable child support. The motion judge dismissed those concerns largely because police investigations had “come to not.” See paras. 34-36.
That was not enough in the Court's view. Section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act requires courts to consider family violence and its impact on parenting. This includes whether an order requiring regular cooperation between parents is appropriate where there are allegations of family violence or high conflict. The Divisional Court found that failing to conduct that analysis, and failing to consider the effect of high conflict on equal parenting time, was an error of law. See paras. 36-38.
The Family Violence Issue Was Important, But Likely Not Determinative
In my view, the family violence issue was important, but it was probably not the determinative reason the Divisional Court allowed the appeal. The Court was clear that the motion judge made an error of law by failing to conduct the analysis required under section 24(4) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, particularly where the order imposed equal parenting time for a very young child and would require regular communication between parents in a case involving allegations of family violence. See paras. 34-38.
But the structure of the Divisional Court’s own temporary parenting order suggests that the appeal likely would have succeeded even without the family violence allegations. The Court did not suspend or sharply restrict the father’s parenting time. Instead, it created a graduated schedule that increased his time, introduced overnights, and moved in the direction of more substantial parenting time in a way that better reflected the AFCC-O Guide’s recommendations for babies and toddlers. See paras. 46-48.
That is important. The error was not that the father should have been denied a growing role in the child’s life. The error was that the motion judge moved too quickly to equal week-about parenting, without properly analyzing the child’s age, status quo, developmental needs, and the AFCC-O Guide’s age-appropriate approach. There still should have been analysis of the family violence allegations, but the presence of such analysis would likely not have changed the graduated schedule that was in harmony with the Guide. The Divisional Court’s own remedy shows that the real focus was not punishment for alleged behaviour, but a more careful and evidence-based transition.
Why This Case Matters for Parents
Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette is important because it rejects two common assumptions.
The first is that equal parenting time is the starting point. Ontario law does not presume equal parenting time. The governing principle is the best interests of the child. The statute requires the court to consider the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being, and to assess the child’s needs in light of age, development, stability, caregiving history and other relevant circumstances. See paras. 17-21.
The second assumption that the Court rejected is that the AFCC-O Parenting Guide is merely optional background reading. It is not binding law, but the social science behind it must be taken seriously. Where a court departs from it, especially for infants and toddlers, the court must properly explain why.
For parents, the practical lesson is that parenting schedules should be built around the child’s developmental stage, not the adult’s preferred outcome. For very young children, that often means a gradual transition, careful attention to sleep and feeding routines, and a realistic assessment of each parent’s caregiving history.
The Divisional Court’s decision is not anti-father or anti-shared parenting. It is pro-child. The Court did not say the father should be marginalized from mere allegations of the mother. In fact, it ordered a parenting schedule that increased his time and introduced overnights. What the Court rejected was the sudden move to equal week-about parenting for a 15-month-old child without a proper best-interests analysis. The lesson is that parenting time is a structure that must support the child’s stability, security, and healthy development.
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